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Abstract
Background: Health care organization is entering a new age. Focus is increasingly shifting from individual health
care institutions to interorganizational collaboration and health care networks. Much hope is set on such networks
which have been argued to improve economic efficiency and quality of care. However, this does not automatically
mean they are always ethically justified. A relevant question that remains is what ethical obligations or duties one
can ascribe to these networks especially because networks involve many risks. Due to their often amorphous and
complex structure, collective responsibility and accountability may increase while individual responsibility goes
down.
Main body: We argue that a business ethics approach to ethical obligations for health care networks, is problematic
and we propose to opt for a patient perspective. Using the classic four principles of biomedical ethics (justice,
nonmaleficence, beneficence and autonomy) it is possible to identify specific ethical duties. Based on the principle of
justice, health care networks have an ethical duty to provide just and fair access for all patients and to be transparent
to patients about how access is regulated. The principle of nonmaleficence implies an obligation to guarantee patient
safety, whereas the principle of beneficence implies an obligation for health care networks to guarantee continuity
of care in all its dimensions. Finally, the principle of autonomy is translated into a specific obligation to promote and
respect patient choice. Networks that fail to meet any of these conditions are suspect and cannot be justified ethically.
Conclusions: Faced with daunting challenges, the health care system is changing rapidly. Currently many hopes ride
on integrated care and broad health care networks. Such networks are the topic of empirical debate, but more
attention should be given to the ethical aspects. Health care networks raise new and pressing ethical issues and
we are in need of a framework for assessing how and when such networks are justified.
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Background
Health care organization is entering a new age. Whereas
traditionally, individual health care institutions formed
the cornerstone of medical care provision, focus is in-
creasingly shifting towards interorganizational collabor-
ation, integrated care, and health care networks (HCNs)
[1, 2]. These changes are caused by many factors, includ-
ing an ageing population and an increasing cost of the
welfare system, resulting in medical resources becoming
scarcer. Hopes are high for these collaborations and
health care networks, which, as studies suggest, could
increase economic efficiency [3] and lead to improved
quality of medical care [4].
However, the mere fact that HCNs may be beneficial
in particular respects and particular contexts does not
automatically mean they are always ethically justified.
Economic efficiency, for example, can come at an ethical
cost. A market-driven HCN could well be perfectly eco-
nomically efficient but ethically unjust in failing to pro-
vide basic care for those worse off. A 2005 study showed
that for-profit hospitals are less likely than not-for-profit
hospitals to offer care that promises less potential profit
for the institutions [5]. This means it is possible that a
particular for-profit hospital or HCN might fail to offer
basic care to patients on the grounds that it is not profit-
able, or they might offer it at an unfairly high price to
guarantee its profitability.
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Likewise, increasing quality of care does not guarantee
ethical justifiability. What counts as quality improve-
ment and how this should be measured is a topic of
much debate. First, there are issues with the very con-
cept itself. It is increasingly being suggested that ‘quality
of care’ is an inherently normative, rather than a descrip-
tive, concept [6] and is thus far from uncontroversial.
Second, there is debate on what we can learn from con-
crete examples of quality improvement. Interventions,
such as the creation of networks, might work to improve
quality in a particular context when particular conditions
apply. There is no guarantee, however, that such inter-
ventions work in every context. The uncritical trans-
plantation of quality improvement interventions is thus
always a risky undertaking. A recent article raised the
provocative question ‘Does quality improvement im-
prove quality?’ [7]. The point is that even when particu-
lar interventions (for this paper, we will consider
creation of networks) are suggested to be beneficial, they
need to be justified in the particular context in which
they will be implemented.
We believe the ethical obligations of health care net-
works are under discussed compared to other issues re-
lating to such networks. Nevertheless, there is an urgent
need to discuss such obligations from an organizational
perspective. The difference between health care net-
works and individual health care institutions or collabo-
rations of health care institutions is not merely size.
Rather, health care networks are often amorphous and
complex. They can be governed in a vast number of
ways, assume any kind of form and involve a complex
set of interactions [8]. While this increases the collective
responsibility of the network, it makes it more difficult
to locate and distribute individual responsibility and ac-
countability [9]. How will fair access to those networks
be guaranteed and by whom? How will patients follow-
ing a care trajectory move throughout such a network?
How will their medical information be safely stored,
shared and transferred within such a complex network?
Such issues need to be high on the agenda. We will not
address each of these issues in depth but will look more
broadly at ethical obligations we can expect such health
care networks to meet.
Business ethics perspective vs. patient perspective
When ethical obligations for networks are discussed, the
issue is commonly approached from an organizational or
a business ethical perspective [10–12]. This seemingly
makes sense, as the question pertains to organizations
such as health care networks and how they should be or-
ganized. Concrete discussions then include how legal
and moral responsibility should be distributed within the
broad network.
‘Business ethics’ can be understood as being ‘the
study of the ethical dimensions of productive organiza-
tions and commercial activities’ [13]. It is clear that
business ethics is not a single approach but rather a
broad concept that can refer to a number of different
approaches. Well-known business approaches include
the shareholder approach, the stakeholder approach,
[12] the corporate social responsibility approach [14]
and the integrative social contracts theory [15]. How-
ever, despite the different approaches, they seem to
share the same basic assumption. When applied to
health care organizations and health care networks,
business ethics starts by conceiving such organizations
or networks as businesses. What exactly constitutes a
business is a complicated and much debated topic [16].
Depending on the particular business ethics approach,
this network then has to meet its fiduciary duties to-
wards shareholders, stakeholder and/or society.
We argue that the choice for such a business ethics
perspective is far from neutral and may raise concerns.
While we believe that conceiving of HCNs as busi-
nesses might be possible, we argue that it is not desir-
able to do so. Considering health networks to be
business entities involves considering them to be en-
gaged in commercial activities and to see patients as
‘consumers’ of that service. Such a business approach
may ignore the relevant ethical differences between pa-
tients and consumers of commercial services. First, pa-
tients are particularly vulnerable and are often in need
of medical care. Second, the ‘service’ provided by health
care networks is ‘medical care’ or ‘health’, which is a
basic and common good. Being healthy is normally not
a luxury good but a basic good that allows one to fully
participate in society [17]. Making health care a com-
mercial, sellable, purchasable and/or marketable good
might degrade it [18]. Third, we know from research
that patients do not operate as equal or rational con-
sumers in the health care market. Most patients in need
of a medical service do not compare different health
care organizations or networks with regards to the
quality and costs of that service [19]. These issues make
it risky to start from the assumption that health care
organizations are businesses.
Additionally, there is a risk that taking a business eth-
ics approach might devaluate the central role of patients
in medical care by conceiving of them as one stake-
holder alongside other stakeholders. This may allow the
interests of patients to be outweighed by the interests of
other stakeholders. However, the ethical obligation to
care first and foremost for the welfare of the patient lies
at the very heart of medicine. We believe it is thus more
fruitful to take an ethics approach to health care net-
works that starts from patients and the ethical claims
they can make on these networks.
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The patient and the four principles
There is near perfect consensus that an ethical commit-
ment to patient welfare is central to the practice of
medicine. The obligation to care first and foremost for
patients constitutes perhaps the strongest ethical obliga-
tion for health care professionals and is enshrined in
codes of medical ethics worldwide [20, 21]. Patients can
thus make strong ethical claims on health care institu-
tions and networks.
A common way of categorizing these ethical claims is
by making use of the well-known and widely accepted
principles of Beauchamp and Childress: in clinical care,
patients can expect health care networks to meet ethical
duties of autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and
justice [22]. Although this framework is often applied to
the patient–physician relationship and the ethics of clin-
ical care, we believe that this obligation transfers from
individual health care professionals to HCNs. Whereas
in clinical care, health care professionals have ethical du-
ties towards individual patients, in HCNs, these duties
take the form of more general ‘duties to design’ [23].
This involves obligations to design the network so that
the interests of all patients (both actual and potential)
within the network are protected.
HCNs’ ethical duties towards patients
Justice and access to the network
It is widely acknowledged that all patients have an eth-
ical claim to just and equitable access to health care
[24]. The issue of justice is particularly important for
HCNs, as they have the potential to significantly impact
how health care is organized and delivered within a
health care system. This is the case when they cover a
larger geographical area or hold a de facto monopoly on
the treatment of particular pathologies or the provision
of particular services in a certain area. In these cases,
the networks, rather than individual health care organi-
zations, become the primary entity through which health
care resources are distributed. The just, fair and equit-
able access to these networks is thus of crucial import-
ance not only for the justifiability of the networks as
such but also for the entire health care system in
general.
Taking the perspective of the patient in need of medical
care, there seems to be a prima facie right to access re-
gardless of how or in what way one enters the network. If
access is denied or limited, this should occur on justifiable
grounds that are transparent, known to the patient and
understandable from the patient’s perspective.
Naturally, much debate exists on what counts as ‘justi-
fiable grounds’ for regulating access to health care in
general or to HCNs in particular [25]. It is an undeniable
truth that the resources of HCNs are limited and that an
acceptable principle of distributive justice for allocating
those limited resources must be chosen. Various possible
distributive justice principles exists, and following Cook-
son and Dolan, these can be categorized as principles
based on (medical) need, maximizing principles and
egalitarian principles [26]. Beauchamp and Childress use
six material principles of justice: (1) an equal share for
each; (2) distribution according to need; (3) distribution
according to effort; (4) distribution according to contri-
bution; (5) distribution according to merit; and (6) distri-
bution according to free-market exchanges [22]. It is
important to emphasize that health care must be distrib-
uted in some way and that an unequal distribution is not
automatically an unfair or unjust distribution.
Without entering the complex debate on justice in
health care, we would argue that, following Norman
Daniels’ idea of ‘accountability for reasonableness’ [27],
HCNs have at least an obligation to be transparent about
the allocation principles they apply and can be held ac-
countable for these principles. Seen from the patient
perspective, patients, we argue, have a right to know
how and according to what principles access to a net-
work is regulated. Based on this knowledge, they should
be able to make a reasonable prediction about their own
access to the network. This is also important to guaran-
tee informed and autonomous patient choice.
Furthermore, even when there is debate about what
constitutes proper grounds for allocating care, there can
be consensus concerning what counts as unjustified
grounds for distribution/allocation. There is wide con-
sensus that factors such as social standing or sexual
orientation can be problematic grounds. HCNs have a
continuing obligation to monitor how they distribute
their resources, and they have a duty to revise or adapt
this distribution should it fail to meet minimally recog-
nized standards of fairness.
Many factors determine access to health care, two of
which are socioeconomic status and geography. First, an
enormous amount of research confirms that higher socio-
economic status is associated with better, easier and/or
faster access to health care. In the US context, much of
the inequality in health care is attributed to socioeco-
nomic inequality [28]. The same situation applies to other
countries. Research indicates that in places such as
Norway and England, higher socioeconomic status is asso-
ciated with shorter waiting times [29, 30]. As regards
geography, the decision by an HCN to offer a particular
service at a single location might advantage those with the
physical capacity and financial means to travel to this loca-
tion. A literature review showed, for example, how travel
burden can be a barrier for both the diagnosis and treat-
ment of cancer [31]. Such knowledge should influence the
organization of HCNs. For example, in Belgium, the gov-
ernment is planning to create 25 regional hospital net-
works, and every hospital (both private and public) will
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have to become part of one of these networks (based on
their geographical location). The governmental policy stip-
ulates that some basic medical services should be provided
at every individual hospital of that network, whereas other
medical services, such as maternity care, should be offered
in some of the network’s hospitals but not all. Care must
be taken that such a policy does not unduly interfere with
patients’ right to autonomous choice of healthcare pro-
vider and, importantly, does not unfairly benefit those liv-
ing close to the network hospitals offering a particular
care. Care must be taken in organizing the provision of
particular medical services within that network so that all
possible patients within the network’s coverage have
access.
Nonmaleficence and safety
A key ethical principle within medicine is the principle of
nonmaleficence. This principle has often been linked to
the well-known ‘first do no harm’ principle. However, as
has been remarked by Beauchamp and Childress in their
discussion of this principle, the concept of harm remains
open to debate. A distinction is sometimes made between
harming (understood as a setback of one’s interests) and
wronging (understood as the violation of one’s legal or
moral rights) [22]. One can, according to this view, thus
be wronged without being harmed. For example, if a pa-
tient’s private medical data are shared with third parties
who do not have justified access to these data, this patient
is wronged, even if she was unaware of this sharing and
suffered no setback of interests as a result. To include
such cases, we take the nonmaleficence principle to be
broader than the ‘first-do-no-harm’ principle and to also
include the duty not to wrong patients.
Applied to HCNs, patients can make the reasonable
ethical claim that receiving medical care within the net-
work is not directly or indirectly harmful or wrongful.
As regards harm, patients may be harmed in various
ways, one of which is the direct physical harm that can
occur when a patient is physically transferred. Some
HCNs may cover large geographical areas, which might
involve lengthy transfers for some patients. By taking the
patient perspective, we believe it is clear that such risky
transfers should always be justified in terms of the ex-
pected benefit for the patient. It is important that in a
field of medicine with increasing attention to economic
efficiency, rationing, cost-containment, and stakeholders,
it is the patient and her safety that form the primary
basis for ethical justifiability.
The ethical claims of patients to not be harmed ex-
tend, of course, beyond the transfer within a network.
Even when patients are not transferred themselves, they
might still be harmed and/or wronged, for example,
when a patient’s health data are unjustly shared, thereby
causing a breach of privacy [32]. Studies indicate that in
the US, the exchange of health care information both
within and between hospitals grew substantially between
2008 and 2012 [33]. In a time in which genetics is rap-
idly becoming increasingly important in medical care, a
patient’s health data might also contain genetic data,
which provide information not only about just the pa-
tient but also about his or her relatives who might not
have voluntarily provided their data.
This issue of sharing patient information is particularly
pressing for HCNs. Such networks have multiple partners,
and sharing of information between these partners might
be necessary, for example, to guarantee proper continuity
of care or to improve quality of care. There is a tendency
towards the creation of large shared data sets, such as the
US Oncology Precision Network (OPeN), which contains
clinical, genomic, pharmacological and treatment response
data from oncology patients in 79 hospitals. Although the
goal of such networks is to improve quality of care, there
are reasons, we argue, to remain careful. One reason is
that due to the often complex structure of HCNs, respon-
sibility and accountability easily become diffused [9, 34].
We therefore believe that HCNs need strong and central-
ized agreements on how medical data are handled within
the network, and power should be given to the patient
who might not be aware of the ways their data are or can
be used. Ethical concern has, for example, been raised
about the possibility of buying and selling available health
data [35].
The ethical duty to protect patient privacy accords
with broader legal tendencies. Internationally, there is a
clear drive towards more stringent data protection and
putting people in charge of their data. An excellent ex-
ample is the recent European General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) [36], which aims to put people in
charge of their own data, including medical data. In this
sense, adequate protection of medical data is not only an
ethical requirement for HCNs but also a legal one.
Beneficence and continuity of care
Patients can also make a legitimate claim that HCNs are
organized to be maximally beneficent. First, this means
that HCNs must be justified in terms of the degree to
which they provide or improve quality of care. HCNs are
often believed to improve quality, for example, due to
the possibility of providing smooth and integrated care
in a setting in which medical professionals from various
disciplines work together [37]. Another advantage of
HCNs in terms of quality might be that, within net-
works, particular medical interventions are or can be
grouped together in one or more member institutions,
which then results in a larger volume of these interven-
tions for these members. Real life examples exist. In
2015, three US hospital systems took a volume pledge in
which they pledged not to have certain specialized
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surgical procedures performed in hospitals where rela-
tively few of those procedures were performed [38]. The
aim was to promote the HCN’s outcomes, as empirical
studies suggest that high volume is associated with bet-
ter outcomes for certain treatments or surgical proce-
dures [39] (although the magnitude of the association is
sometimes questioned [40]).
Of course, although the general principle of increased
quality may be valid for HCNs, this has to be shown to
improve health care outcomes for each individual con-
text. Additionally, the allocation of particular interven-
tions to a particular HCN member must be justified by
reference to patient benefit. Care must also be taken that
the centralization of care in a particular network mem-
ber does not result in a net loss of justice or patient au-
tonomy. For example, in 2011, the US Carolinas
HealthCare System Levine Cancer Institute covered 38
hospitals, and all patients had to travel to a central hos-
pital for specialized cancer care. Such an organization is
at risk of not meeting their ethical obligations of fairness
and autonomy. More recently, the HCN switched its
strategy with the creation of more than 20 decentralized
centres and clinics [2].
Second, patients entering an HCN will follow a par-
ticular care trajectory, which might involve particular
members of the HCN. The organization of this trajec-
tory is largely irrelevant from the patient’s perspective.
Patients not only have a right to quality care but also
have an additional ethical right to smooth and high qual-
ity care throughout their entire care trajectory. Networks
should thus be designed to maximally guarantee con-
tinuity of care. This involves three dimensions [41].
First, there should be informational continuity. HCNs
have the obligation to ensure that relevant patient infor-
mation is transferred safely and effectively for the benefit
of the patient. The HCN must strike the right balance
between sharing too much (thereby potentially harming
the patient and breaching the duty of nonmaleficence)
and sharing too little (thereby failing to maximally bene-
fit the patient and breaching the duty of beneficence).
Second, HCNs should guarantee management con-
tinuity. There should be, within the network, a shared
approach to the management of a particular health con-
dition. Patients may suffer harm if they are transferred
within a network only to be confronted with a different
approach each time. It has been argued that, according
to interviewed cancer specialists, one of the most signifi-
cant barriers to high quality cancer care, for example, is
‘unnecessary variation in cancer care because of lack of
standardization’ [42]. This would also be a breach of the
ethical principle of nonmaleficence.
Third, there should be relational continuity. Phys-
ician–patient relationships remain the cornerstone of
modern medicine. Research shows that trust in one’s
primary physician is a reliable predictor of adherence to
a treatment or medical regime [43]. When patients or
their care are transferred within the HCN, so should the
therapeutic relation and corresponding responsibility be.
Without relational continuity, there is a risk of ‘collusion
of anonymity’, in which ‘the patient is passed from one
specialist to another with nobody taking responsibility
for the whole person’ [44]. The trend towards HCNs car-
ries with it the risk that patients are transferred without
transfer of relational continuity. Again, due to the com-
plex nature of HCNs, attribution and transfer of respon-
sibility might be an issue. This is a classic case of a
‘problem of many hands’, in which collective undesirable
effects occur without the possibility of holding any one
individually responsible [9]. As such, HCNs need central
arrangements regarding the distribution of responsibility
and accountability so that at all times, someone is re-
sponsible and/or accountable and, perhaps more import-
antly, that someone also feels responsible. From the
perspective of the patient, it is primarily the latter that is
particularly important. As an example, one could con-
sider the use of patient navigators in the US who help
individual patients navigate the often complex US health
care system [45]. Such a designated patient navigator
could be justified by reference to the ethical principle of
beneficence but has likewise been argued to help pro-
mote justice and equality [46].
Patient autonomy
Following the ethical principle of autonomy, HCNs have an
ethical obligation to respect and actively promote patient
autonomy. This principle may include the right to max-
imally make autonomous choices in one’s care trajectory
and the right to choose one’s preferred health care profes-
sional or provider. The latter is, besides being a moral right,
often also a recognized legal right in most jurisdictions.
However, this ethical duty to promote autonomy might
in some situations seemingly conflict with HCNs’ ethical
duty of beneficence. For example, an HCN might choose
to allocate a certain health care service to one network
member, thereby transferring all patients in need of this
service to this member institution. From the perspective
of beneficence, grouping all patients within a single in-
stitution might be justified. However, if networks are de-
signed so that particular patients (or their data) are
automatically transferred to particular institutions or
patients are automatically put onto a particular care
pathway, this could violate the ethical principle of pa-
tient autonomy, as patients are then unable to choose
the institution they want to be treated in and the way in
which they are treated. Earlier in the paper, we provided
an example of a 38-hospital network in which all cancer
patients had to travel to a central cancer centre to re-
ceive specialized cancer care [2].
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One potential way out of this conflict is to use
so-called clinical nudges [47, 48]. In principle, nudges
are a form of choice-architecture in which, for example,
particular policies are enacted that nudge patients to-
wards a particular behaviour or choice, without overrid-
ing their right to free choice. Recently, there was a
published plea for the creation of so-called ‘nudge units’
in health care institutions, which ‘systematically develop
and test approaches using nudges to improve health care
delivery’ [49]. In 2016, Penn Medicine started the Penn
Medicine Nudge Unit, which devotes itself to testing
such potential nudges.
Many examples of nudges in health care exist. A
well-known and empirically tested example of a success-
ful nudge is the use of default options [50]. In the con-
text of HCNs, one could imagine a network in which
patients with a particular pathology or in need of a par-
ticular medical service are transferred to a designated
network member, but patients have the option to instead
choose their own institution, should they prefer to do
so. Such nudges allow for an HCN to become maximally
efficient while protecting patient autonomy. If, for par-
ticular medical interventions, patients are referred to the
network member with the largest volume for that inter-
vention by default, this could increase quality of care
and provide these patients with the best chance for the
best outcome.
It has been argued that such nudges are ethically dis-
tinct from purely paternalistic interventions [48]. First,
there is often no nudge-free way to design an HCN.
Every health care network needs to be designed in some
way, and this will inevitably influence patients’ choices in
some way. The question is thus not whether nudges
should be employed but rather the direction in which
nudges should point. Second, even if certain choices
might be facilitated, nudges always allow for free choice.
There is no automatic overriding of choices patients
make. Third, in some cases, nudges might actually help
align patients’ choices with their own underlying values.
For example, it is well established that patients often
choose their health care provider because they are lo-
cated near to it or because a particular provider has been
recommended to them by their family or GP [19], rather
than on medical or value-based grounds. One could de-
sign one’s network so that patients are more likely to
end up with caregivers that provide the best possible
care that aligns with their own particular value. This is
distinct from hard paternalism, in which patient choices
are overridden based on the caregivers’ values.
Many commentators remain sceptical about and doubt
the justifiability of clinical nudges in some health care
contexts[51–53]. Indeed, depending on how strong the
nudge is, it always runs the risk of becoming a paternal-
istic intervention. For example, in the hypothetical case
mentioned above, in which there is a default choice but
patients are allowed to override the default option, pa-
tients may perhaps not be aware of the option to over-
ride. Others might be overly fearful of the consequences
of overriding the default option. The mere presence of a
possibility to override does not suffice for guaranteeing
autonomous choice.
However, while we acknowledge that such critiques of
nudges remain valid, we believe that they do not dis-
credit the entire undertaking of nudges. As with the
other principles discussed in this paper, we believe that
the validity of nudges as a general principle does not jus-
tify the use of every kind of nudge in every kind of con-
text. We are, instead, arguing that in the organization of
networks, attention should be given to the relation be-
tween the way the network is designed and the kinds of
patient decisions it incentivizes.
Conclusions
Health care networks are well underway to assuming
a more central role in tomorrow’s organized health
care. A significant amount of research has been de-
voted to these networks. Nevertheless, their ethical
aspects remain little discussed but are nevertheless
pressing. Even when HCNs are shown to be benefi-
cial, they still carry with them significant ethical risk.
Due to their often amorphous and complex structure,
individual responsibility may become highly diffuse,
even up to a point where it is unclear who is respon-
sible or accountable for what. In regard to issues as
patient care and the safe storage and transfer of pa-
tient data, such a lack of individual responsibility may
be problematic.
We therefore believe that it is high time to discuss
ethical obligations we can expect HCNs to meet. We
believe such a framework of ethical HCN obligations
needs to start from the patient perspective rather than
from the (as we have argued) more problematic busi-
ness ethics perspective. For matters of clarity, we have
categorized HCNs’ obligations towards patients using
Beauchamp and Childress’ four principles of justice,
nonmaleficence, beneficence and autonomy. For HCNs,
this translates into duties to design the network so that
it is responsive to patients’ medical needs and autono-
mous choices. More specifically, the principle of justice
requires HCNs to provide just and equal access; non-
maleficence requires them to protect patients from
harming and wronging; beneficence requires them to
guarantee continuity of care; and autonomy requires
them to allow patients to maximally make free choices
in their care trajectory. Only when such obligations or
duties are met in a particular context can the HCN be
considered ethically justified.
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